Agricultural economists have long understood that tenure insecurity produces suboptimal land use: tenants who cannot claim the fruits of long-term investment rationally choose short-term extraction over stewardship. The "Marshallian inefficiency" of share tenancy applies with equal force to contemporary digital platforms, where Web2 architecture creates analogous conditions. Users labor on rented land they do not own and cannot improve.
The cultural consequences of platform dependency follow from the absence of digital property rights. These consequences include anxiety, disposability, and the death of digital heritage. The analysis draws upon classical economics from Alfred Marshall and Joseph Stiglitz, surveillance capitalism theory from Shoshana Zuboff, and the distributist philosophy of G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc.
The Myceloom Protocol's first axiom, "Sovereignty First," emerges not as ideological preference but as economic necessity. Genuine culture requires the security of ownership. Digital feudalism produces a culture of disposal; digital sovereignty enables a culture of stewardship. Cultivating digital heritage requires first securing digital property rights.
Introduction: The Tenant's Dilemma
In agricultural history, sharecropping arrangements often defined the economic lives of millions. Tenants worked land they did not own, surrendering a significant portion of their harvest to landlords who controlled the soil. Such tenants faced what economists would later term the "Marshallian inefficiency": because they received only a fraction of the marginal product of their labor, they rationally underinvested in the land's long-term productivity.2 Terracing hillsides against erosion makes unlikely sense when next year's lease might not be renewed. Building irrigation invites risk when the landlord could evict a tenant for questioning accounts.
The tenant's dilemma was not primarily about laziness or moral failing but about rational response to irrational incentive structures. Tenure insecurity produces short-term thinking as surely as gravity produces falling objects.
One hundred and fifty years later, a different kind of sharecropping has emerged. Billions of users cultivate content on platforms they do not own. They build audiences and communities on rented land that can be seized, shadowbanned, or algorithmically buried at any moment.3
Digital sharecroppers face the same fundamental dilemma as their agricultural predecessors. Investing in lasting work becomes irrational when the platform can change its terms of service overnight. Building for the next generation serves no purpose when an automated system can suspend an account without appeal.
The Myceloom Protocol's first axiom states it plainly: "No node SHALL be built on rented land."4 The statement represents not ideological assertion but an economic principle derived from centuries of evidence about what tenure insecurity does to human behavior. A tenant can never be a true peer. Systems dependent on infrastructure controlled by external parties cannot maintain long-term autonomy or participate in reciprocal relationships.
The political economy of digital sovereignty demonstrates that the epidemic of ephemeral content, the anxiety of platform dependency, and the impossibility of digital heritage follow from the absence of digital property rights. The sharecropper's tragedy repeats in digital form: without ownership, there can be no stewardship; without security, there can be no investment in permanence.
I. The Economics of Tenure Insecurity
Alfred Marshall, in Principles of Economics (1890), first articulated the theoretical problem with share tenancy. Under such arrangements, the cultivator receives only a fraction of the marginal product of additional effort or investment.5 If planting an extra row would yield one hundred dollars in revenue, the tenant receives only fifty. Rational economic actors therefore supply effort only to the point where their share of the marginal product equals their marginal cost, a point well below the socially optimal level of investment.
Marshall's insight proved durable. Joseph Stiglitz, in his 1974 Review of Economic Studies analysis "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," formalized the efficiency implications: share tenancy creates systematic underinvestment because "the share system does not provide adequate incentives for effort or risk-taking."6 The sharecropper, facing only partial returns to improvement, rationally chooses suboptimal input application.
The empirical evidence confirmed the theory. Klaus Deininger, Songqing Jin, and Vandana Yadav's 2013 study in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics examined West Bengal's tenancy reforms. The study found that sharecropping arrangements reduced long-term investment in soil fertility and irrigation by more than twenty percent compared to owner-cultivated land.7 Sharecroppers systematically underinvested in terracing, drainage, and perennial crops. They avoided anything requiring upfront costs for future returns. The land degraded not because tenants were irresponsible but because the incentive structure made responsibility irrational.
The economic effects of tenure insecurity extend beyond measurable underinvestment into psychological terrain. Historical research on tenancy systems reveals that they produced not merely inefficient agriculture but a distinctive condition of anxiety, dependency, and temporal compression.8
Tenants lived under constant threat of eviction. Landlords could terminate arrangements for complex or arbitrary reasons. Under these conditions, rational actors developed what sociologists term "present-orientation": a systematic devaluation of future returns relative to immediate survival.9 Long-term planning became not economically suboptimal but psychologically impossible.
The system also produced learned helplessness. Decades of research in psychology demonstrate that when organisms experience uncontrollable outcomes, they develop generalized passivity extending far beyond the original conditions.10 Sharecroppers who could not control their economic fate often ceased attempting to improve their circumstances even in domains where improvement was possible. The tenure insecurity infected adjacent areas of life.
Finally, insecure tenancy created conditions preventing what economists term "consumption smoothing." Without secure tenure, families could not build reserves against bad harvests. The landlord's control over the land became control over intergenerational mobility itself.
II. The Digital Plantation: Platform Capitalism as Sharecropping
Shoshana Zuboff's analysis The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019) established the critique of platform economics. Zuboff argues that digital platforms operate through a novel economic logic: "the unilateral claiming of private human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data."12 Users are not customers but sources of raw material. Their behavior, preferences, relationships, and attention are converted into "behavioral surplus" feeding prediction markets.
The parallel to agricultural extraction is precise. Just as landlords claimed a share of the sharecropper's harvest, platforms claim behavioral surplus from user activity. Just as sharecroppers worked land they could not own, users labor on platforms they cannot control. The digital landlord extracts value not through explicit crop-sharing but through what Zuboff terms "rendition": the conversion of human experience into data commodities without meaningful consent or compensation.13
Zuboff identifies the asymmetry at the heart of this arrangement: "Surveillance capitalism unilaterally claims human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data."14 Users provide the labor. They create content, build audiences, and train algorithms through their interactions. Platforms capture the surplus value. The relationship is not reciprocal but extractive, not partnership but tenancy.
Yanis Varoufakis extends this analysis in Technofeudalism (2023), arguing that platform economics represents not merely a variant of capitalism but a regression to pre-capitalist modes of extraction. "What we are witnessing," Varoufakis contends, "is the emergence of a new feudalism, where digital platforms operate as fiefdoms extracting rent rather than generating profit through productive investment."15
The feudal analogy illuminates features of platform economics. Medieval lords did not profit by selling products but by controlling access to land, blocking access unless tenants paid rent for the privilege of cultivation. Similarly, platforms profit not by producing goods but by controlling access to digital infrastructure, charging rent (in attention, data, and direct fees) for the privilege of participation.
Research on "datafeudalism" identifies the contemporary parallels: "feudal relations of dispossession, predation, domination, servitude and vassalage" now operate through data extraction rather than land control.16 Users are bound to platforms through network effects and data lock-in as surely as serfs were bound to manors through legal obligation and economic necessity. The platform can change terms of service unilaterally; the user has no negotiating power.
Such dynamics create what scholars term "digital enclosure": the privatization of previously common digital spaces under platform control.17 Just as the English enclosure movements converted common lands into private property, displacing peasants who had cultivated them for generations, platform economics converts digital commons into proprietary spaces where users labor at the landlord's pleasure.
The Marshallian inefficiency now operates at civilizational scale. Digital content creators face the same fundamental choice as agricultural sharecroppers: invest in lasting work that platforms can devalue at any moment, or optimize for immediate extraction before the algorithm changes.
The evidence of systematic underinvestment is visible. Content becomes shorter, shallower, more disposable, optimized for platform engagement metrics rather than enduring value. The average attention span for online content has compressed; users scroll rather than read, consume rather than contemplate.18 Creators rationally adapt to platform incentives, producing work designed for momentary virality rather than permanent relevance.
Long-form journalism collapses into hot takes. Educational content becomes edutainment. Artistic expression surrenders to algorithmic optimization. Such shifts represent not failures of individual creators but rational responses to platform incentive structures. Spending months crafting a documentary yields poor returns when a fifteen-second clip generates more engagement. Building a comprehensive archive fails to pay off when platforms reward recency over depth.
The psychological effects parallel historical sharecropping. Platform dependency produces chronic anxiety, defined by the constant fear of algorithmic demotion, account suspension, or terms-of-service changes that can destroy years of audience-building overnight.19 Creators report the same learned helplessness documented among agricultural sharecroppers: a sense that their fate depends on opaque systems beyond their control or comprehension.
Finally, the system produces intergenerational failure. Digital sharecroppers cannot pass their accumulated work to successors. Platforms routinely delete accounts of deceased users. Terms of service prohibit account transfer. Content disappears when platforms shut down or pivot to new business models.20 Each digital generation begins again at zero, unable to build upon predecessors' work. The cultural accumulation that defines civilization—the transmission of knowledge, art, and wisdom across time—becomes impossible. Every generation must rebuild from scratch upon rented land.
III. The Death of Digital Heritage
A. The Great Digital Revocation
The Autogravitas Protocol identifies the central crisis: "We have leased our history, identity, and worth to centralized platforms. The digital self is perpetually light, lacking the intrinsic weight to resist dissolution or removal."21 Such condition of perpetual contingency—what the Protocol terms the "Great Digital Revocation"—defines the existential situation of digital sharecroppers.
Every digital asset created on platform infrastructure exists at the landlord's pleasure. Terms of service reserve the right to delete content, suspend accounts, or modify the conditions of access without notice or explanation.22 Users invest years building audiences, creating archives, and cultivating communities. Yet they do so without any legal or technical guarantee that their work will exist tomorrow.
The revocations are not hypothetical. Platforms routinely purge content, ban creators, and eliminate entire categories of material. The justifications vary. Reasons range from policy violations to business pivots. Yet the pattern remains constant: platform control trumps user investment.23 Creators who built their livelihoods on specific platforms have seen those livelihoods evaporate overnight. This occurs through decisions they could neither anticipate nor appeal.
B. Heterogravitas: The Borrowed Weight
The Autogravitas Protocol distinguishes between two forms of digital authority. Autogravitas describes "intrinsic, self-verified weight and authority established through philosophical rigor, demonstrable provenance, and structural independence from platform validation."24 Heterogravitas, by contrast, describes "authority granted by a third-party (e.g., verified checkmark, follower count, centralized registry). This status is ephemeral and must be rejected."25
The distinction clarifies why platform-based identity cannot sustain cultural heritage. Heterogravitas, or borrowed weight, depends entirely on the platform's continued endorsement. The verified checkmark can be removed; the follower count can be reset; the algorithmic boost can be withdrawn. Identity built on heterogravitas represents identity built on sand.
The status quo of digital existence operates entirely through heterogravitas. Identity stems from platform-granted verified checkmarks and follower counts. Brand value relies on trending topics and platform-optimized content. The monetary model depends on the attention economy and external ad spend.26 Every dimension of digital value depends on platform validation that can be revoked without recourse.
Under these conditions, genuine digital heritage becomes impossible. Heritage requires continuity across time, the transmission of accumulated value from one generation to the next. Platform-based assets, however, cannot be transmitted; they can only be leased for the duration of the landlord's tolerance. The digital self leaves no inheritable estate, only abandoned accounts and orphaned content scattered across defunct platforms.
C. The Culture of Disposal
The absence of digital property rights produces a distinctive culture: not stewardship but disposal; not permanence but ephemerality; not heritage but amnesia.
Such culture manifests in content production optimized for immediate consumption rather than lasting value. Dominant formats structurally encode disposability. Examples include stories that disappear in twenty-four hours and feeds that privilege recency over quality.27 Creators internalize these values, producing work designed to be consumed and forgotten rather than preserved and revisited.
The culture of disposal also manifests in user behavior. Without ownership, users treat digital spaces as temporary rather than permanent. Users accumulate rather than curate. They scroll rather than study. They consume rather than create. The relationship to digital artifacts becomes extractive rather than stewardship-oriented. The goal becomes taking immediate value and abandoning the resource when depleted.
Most profoundly, the culture of disposal affects identity itself. Without stable, owned digital presence, individuals cannot develop coherent online identities persisting across time. Individuals become what platforms need them to be in each moment—content-generating resources optimized for behavioral data extraction—rather than autonomous selves with continuous histories and lasting projects.28
IV. The Distributist Alternative
A. Chesterton, Belloc, and the Third Way
The sharecropper's dilemma is not new, and neither is the solution. A century ago, G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc articulated a political economy specifically designed to address the pathologies of landlessness: distributism.
Distributism emerged in early twentieth-century England as a Catholic response to both capitalism and socialism. Against capitalism's tendency toward wealth concentration, and socialism's tendency toward state concentration, distributism advocated widespread private ownership of productive property.29 The goal was neither plutocracy nor collectivism but a society of proprietors—citizens whose ownership of the means of production guaranteed their independence and dignity.
Chesterton articulated the philosophical foundation: "Property is merely the art of democracy. It means that every man should have something that he can shape in his own image, as he is shaped in the image of heaven."30 Ownership is not economic convenience but ontological necessity—the condition under which human beings can realize their nature as creative, self-determining agents.
Belloc, in The Servile State (1912), warned that modern economies were producing a new form of unfreedom. Without widespread ownership, citizens would become dependent on either capitalist employers or state welfare systems, nominally free but practically servile.31 The alternative was not revolution but restoration: returning to citizens the property rights that industrialization had stripped away.
B. Subsidiarity and the Sovereignty Principle
Central to distributist thought is the principle of subsidiarity: decisions should be made at the lowest capable level, and power should not be concentrated beyond what specific functions require.32 Such principle directly challenges platform architecture, which centralizes control over digital infrastructure in the hands of a few corporations while users retain no meaningful authority over the spaces they inhabit.
The Myceloom Protocol embeds subsidiarity as Axiom III: "Intelligence is not a property of the center; it is a property of the edge."33 Decision-making must occur at the lowest capable level; network-wide behaviors must emerge from local interactions rather than central coordination. Individual nodes must maintain autonomous decision-making capacity rather than depending on platform algorithms to determine their fate.
The sovereignty principle follows directly. If decisions should be made locally, and if decision-making requires control over relevant resources, then individuals must own the digital infrastructure upon which their digital lives depend. Platform dependency violates subsidiarity by concentrating control at the center; sovereignty restores it by distributing control to the edge.
C. Digital Distributism in Practice
Applied to digital infrastructure, distributism implies radical restructuring of how users relate to platforms. Instead of renting space on corporate servers, individuals would own their digital presence. They would control their data, their identity, and their accumulated work. This ownership would possess the same legal and technical security that property owners enjoy over physical assets.
The Myceloom Protocol operationalizes this vision through its sovereignty requirements: "Nodes MUST control their own data storage. Nodes MUST control their own identity infrastructure. Nodes MUST be capable of independent operation without reliance on third-party platforms."34 Such mandates represent not aspirational guidelines but constitutive requirements. Systems violating sovereignty cannot participate in reciprocal relationships; they can only be tenants on others' land.
The contrast with current platform architecture is stark. Under platform capitalism, users access digital infrastructure only on terms dictated by platform owners, terms that can be changed unilaterally and enforced algorithmically. Under digital distributism, users would own their digital presence outright, participating in networks through protocols that neither side can unilaterally modify.
The vision aligns with emerging technical infrastructure including self-sovereign identity systems, decentralized storage networks, and federated social protocols.35 The technical means for digital distributism already exist; what remains is the political will to implement them against the interests of incumbent platform landlords.
V. From Feudalism to Stewardship: The Sovereignty Imperative
A. The Stabit Fulfillment
The Autogravitas Protocol takes its motto from the Isle of Man: Quocunque Jeceris Stabit—"Whithersoever you throw it, it will stand."36 The phrase captures the quality that digital assets currently lack and must acquire: the intrinsic weight to endure independent of external support.
Platform-based content fails this test. Throwing a YouTube video into the future results in it standing only as long as YouTube chooses to host it. Projecting an Instagram presence forward results in it vanishing when the platform pivots or the algorithm changes. Nothing built on rented land can fulfill the Stabit requirement because nothing built on rented land truly belongs to its builder.
The Protocol specifies the alternative: "The ultimate goal of digital existence is not popularity, but permanence. The true digital monument must possess the intrinsic weight to endure."37 The requirement reorients digital creation away from platform metrics—virality, engagement, follower counts—toward qualities enabling persistence: structural independence, archival accessibility, and ownership security.
B. Stewardship Over Extraction
The shift from heterogravitas to autogravitas transforms the creator's relationship to their work. Platform-dependent creators are necessarily extractive, optimizing for immediate returns before the landlord changes the rules. Sovereign creators can be stewards, investing in long-term value because they will capture the long-term returns.
Such divergence parallels the difference between sharecroppers and owner-cultivators documented in agricultural economics. Owner-cultivators terrace hillsides because they will benefit from erosion prevention for decades. Cultivators plant perennial crops because they will harvest them for years. Landowners build soil fertility because they and their children will farm this land for generations.38 The security of ownership enables the temporal extension necessary for stewardship.
Digital stewardship means creating work designed to persist and improve over time. Archives must deepen. Projects must mature. Identities must develop coherence across decades. Stewardship requires treating digital presence not as content to be consumed but as heritage to be cultivated. True preservation entails building not for the next algorithmic cycle but for the next generation.
C. The Inheritance Problem
The question of inheritance is central. Agricultural wealth can be transmitted across generations precisely because property rights enable such transmission. Parents can leave land to children; children can build upon what parents began. Cultural accumulation, the progressive improvement of condition that defines civilizational advance, requires this intergenerational transfer.
Digital sharecropping makes inheritance impossible. Platform terms of service prohibit account transfer; accounts of deceased users are deleted; content disappears when platforms shut down.39 Each generation must begin again from zero, unable to build upon the digital estate of predecessors.
The Myceloom Protocol addresses this through the "Heirloom" layer: "Data, code, or systems designed for long-term preservation and succession across platform lifecycles."40 The Protocol mandates that compliant systems document succession paths, use human-readable formats, and enable data export in open standards. The goal is digital infrastructure that can be inherited, passed from one generation to the next as accumulated cultural wealth.
The Heirloom layer represents not technical specification but civilizational requirement. Cultures that cannot transmit accumulated knowledge across generations cannot progress; they can only repeat. The death of digital heritage is the death of digital civilization, resulting in an endless present without memory or accumulation.
The tragedy of the sharecropper was not poverty alone but the systemic conditions that made improvement impossible. Tenure insecurity, extractive economics, and the absence of property rights combined to trap millions in cycles of dependency extending across generations. The solution was not charity but structural change: land reform that gave cultivators ownership of what they worked.
The tragedy of the digital sharecropper recapitulates this pattern in new form. Users labor on platforms they cannot own, building value they cannot retain, creating content they cannot protect. The Marshallian inefficiency operates at civilizational scale, producing systematic underinvestment in lasting digital culture. Anxiety, ephemerality, and the impossibility of heritage follow directly from the absence of digital property rights.
The Myceloom Protocol's first axiom, "No node SHALL be built on rented land," emerges not as ideological preference but as economic necessity derived from centuries of evidence about what tenure insecurity does to human behavior.41 A tenant can never be a true peer. Systems dependent on infrastructure controlled by external parties cannot maintain autonomy or participate in reciprocal relationships.
The distributist alternative offers the framework for reform. Widespread ownership of productive property, applied to digital infrastructure, would enable the sovereignty necessary for digital culture. Users who own their data, control their identity, and operate independent infrastructure can invest in lasting work because they will capture the lasting returns. Stewardship replaces extraction when ownership replaces tenancy.
The technical means already exist. Self-sovereign identity, decentralized storage, federated protocols, and archival systems provide the infrastructure for digital ownership. What remains is the political recognition that digital property rights are not luxury but necessity, serving as the prerequisite for any digital heritage worth transmitting.
The sharecropper's dilemma admits one resolution: ownership. Digital civilization faces the same choice. Cultivating digital heritage on rented land proves impossible. Building lasting culture requires lasting property rights. Transmitting accumulated value to future generations remains unachievable while platforms control the terms of transmission.
Nodes must own their ground. Creators must forge their weight. Builders must design for the next century, not the next fiscal quarter.
Quocunque Jeceris Stabit.
Works Cited
- Ainslie, George. Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Allen, Christopher. "The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity." Life with Alacrity (blog), April 25, 2016. http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html.
- Belloc, Hilaire. The Servile State. London: T.N. Foulis, 1912.
- Boyle, James. "The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain." Law and Contemporary Problems 66, no. 1 (2003): 33-74.
- Chesterton, G.K. The Outline of Sanity. London: Methuen, 1927.
- Chesterton, G.K. What's Wrong with the World. London: Cassell, 1910.
- Deininger, Klaus, Songqing Jin, and Vandana Yadav. "Does Sharecropping Affect Long-term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal's Tenancy Reforms." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95, no. 3 (2013): 772-790.
- Duffy, Brooke Erin. (Not) Getting Paid to Do What You Love: Gender, Social Media, and Aspirational Work. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
- Gillespie, Tarleton. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018.
- Hartzog, Woodrow. Privacy's Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New Technologies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Kasket, Elaine. All the Ghosts in the Machine: The Digital Afterlife of Your Personal Data. London: Robinson, 2019.
- Mark, Gloria. Attention Span: A Groundbreaking Way to Restore Balance, Happiness and Productivity. New York: Hanover Square Press, 2023.
- Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan, 1890.
- Pope Pius XI. Quadragesimo Anno. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1931.
- Ransom, Roger L., and Richard Sutch. One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Sadowski, Jathan. "When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction." Big Data & Society 6, no. 1 (2019): 1-12.
- Seligman, Martin E.P. Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1975.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping." The Review of Economic Studies 41, no. 2 (1974): 219-255.
- Unearth Heritage Foundry. "The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)." In The Myceloom Protocol Suite Compilation V2. January 2026.
- Unearth Heritage Foundry. "The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)." In The Myceloom Protocol Suite Compilation V2. January 2026.
- Varoufakis, Yanis. Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism. London: Bodley Head, 2023.
- Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2019.
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Unearth Heritage Foundry, "Digital Sharecropping," in The Unearth Lexicon of Digital Archaeology (2025), https://unearth.wiki. See also Tenure Insecurity, Platform Dependency, Extractive Economics. ↩
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Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1890), Book VI, Chapter X. ↩
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Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 8-11. ↩
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"The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)," in The Myceloom Protocol Suite Compilation V2 (Unearth Heritage Foundry, January 2026), Axiom I. ↩
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Marshall, Principles of Economics, Book VI, Chapter X, Section 4. ↩
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Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies 41, no. 2 (1974): 219-255. ↩
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Klaus Deininger, Songqing Jin, and Vandana Yadav, "Does Sharecropping Affect Long-term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal's Tenancy Reforms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95, no. 3 (2013): 772-790. ↩
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Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 56-80. ↩
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George Ainslie, Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 161-189. ↩
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Martin E.P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1975), 21-44. ↩
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Ransom and Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, 149-170. ↩
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Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 8. ↩
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Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 233-237. ↩
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Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 8. ↩
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Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism (London: Bodley Head, 2023), 12-15. ↩
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Jathan Sadowski, "When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction," Big Data & Society 6, no. 1 (2019): 1-12. ↩
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James Boyle, "The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain," Law and Contemporary Problems 66, no. 1 (2003): 33-74. ↩
-
Gloria Mark, Attention Span: A Groundbreaking Way to Restore Balance, Happiness and Productivity (New York: Hanover Square Press, 2023), 45-67. ↩
-
Brooke Erin Duffy, (Not) Getting Paid to Do What You Love: Gender, Social Media, and Aspirational Work (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 89-112. ↩
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Elaine Kasket, All the Ghosts in the Machine: The Digital Afterlife of Your Personal Data (London: Robinson, 2019), 23-45. ↩
-
"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," in The Myceloom Protocol Suite Compilation V2 (Unearth Heritage Foundry, January 2026), Section I. ↩
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Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy's Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New Technologies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 156-178. ↩
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Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 97-125. ↩
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"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," Section I. ↩
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"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," Section I. ↩
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"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," Section II.C. ↩
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Mark, Attention Span, 78-95. ↩
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Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 293-327. ↩
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G.K. Chesterton, The Outline of Sanity (London: Methuen, 1927), 42-67. ↩
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G.K. Chesterton, What's Wrong with the World (London: Cassell, 1910), 59. ↩
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Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State (London: T.N. Foulis, 1912), 78-103. ↩
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Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1931), paragraph 79. ↩
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"The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)," Axiom III. ↩
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"The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)," Axiom I, Requirements. ↩
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Christopher Allen, "The Path to Self-Sovereign Identity," Life with Alacrity (blog), April 25, 2016, http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html. ↩
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"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," Section I. ↩
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"The Autogravitas Protocol (TAP)," Section I. ↩
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Deininger, Jin, and Yadav, "Does Sharecropping Affect Long-term Investment?," 780-785. ↩
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Kasket, All the Ghosts in the Machine, 67-89. ↩
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"The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)," Appendix A: Glossary. ↩
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"The Myceloom Protocol (MCP-1)," Axiom I. ↩